Dave Westley v. Farmer\u27s Insurance Exchange et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Dave Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lambertus Jansen; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Warren Patten; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, No. 18225 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2902
IN THE sryPRE~E COUR~ OF ~~E 
STATE OF UTAH 
-------- -~-·------- ... ----·-------- ------------ ---.. --·----------- - ---------·-
DAVE WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs .. 
FhID-mR' S !NSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
dba FARMER 1 S INSURANCE GROUP, 
DBVEAUX CLARK a11d CLAR.I< YOUNG, 
Defendants/~espondants. 
sarzF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 18225 
------------------
RESPONnENTS' BRIEF 
On Appeal f:r.:om the '11hi.cd Judicial Dist.r ict Court 
in and for Salt Lake Cou~~y, 3tate of Utah 
The Hono~able G. Pal Taylor 
·---------~---
LAMBF.R1rus JANSEN 
525 5cuth 30C East 
Salt La~e City, U~3h 841:1 
'r'='lephone: (80:.~ 521-2')S2 
Att~rney for Plaintiff/App~llant 
WARREN Pti.TTEN 
800 Continental Bank Build1nJ 
Sa:'..t Lak~ City, Utah P.4.iO.l 
Telep~one: (801) 531-8900 
Attocneys for D~f ~ndant/Pespo~den~ 
FILED 
-· t:.i 1982 
u..c·-·•••········- .. C t I:· • 
Cl:.r~. Sup.;::-.-:"3 ,01.:r • - :.:.• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMER Is !NSURANCE EXCHANGE I 
dba FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, 
DEVEAUX ~LARK and CLARK YOUNG, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 18225 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
LAMBERTUS JANSEN 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
WARREN PATTEN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . iii 
NATURE OF THE CASE • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . l 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT • . . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS • • 2 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
I. APPELLANT IMPERMISSIBLY BASED HIS ARGUMENT 
ON MATERIAL WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE RECORD 5 
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
UNCONTESTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT • • • • • • • 6 
A. 
B. 
c. 
There Is No Contract Respecting The 
500 Series Policies ••••• 
1. The Agent Appointment Agreement is an 
Integrated Contract and as Such Cannot be 
6 
Varied by Extrinsic Evidence • . • • • 8 
2o The Agent Appointment Agreement Has Not 
Been Modified to Provide for 500 Series 
Policy Assignments . • • . • • . • 9 
3. Farmers' Agent Guide is Not a 
Separate Contract • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
Even If The Policy Is Deemed A Contract 
There Has Been No Breach • . • • • . • • 
1. Farmers Did Not Promise to Let Agents 
11 
Retain 500 Series Policies • • • • • . • • 11 
2. Farmers' Withdrawal of the 500 Series 
Policies Was in its Own and the Policy-
holders' Best Interests and, Hence, 
Justified • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • 12 
There Can Be No Cause of Action Against The 
Defendant Clark For Breach of Contract • • • 
(ii) 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND WAS A VALID EXERCISE_OF DISCRETION . • 16 
CONCLUSION . • . . . . . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING • 
CASES 
Book v. Book 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
59 Wyo. 423, 141 P. 2d 546 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Dupler v. Yates 
10 Utah 324, 351 P.2d 624 (1960) 
Efco Distr. Inc. v. Perrin 
17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966) 
Holbrook Company v. Adams 
542 P.2d 191 (Utah, 1975) 
J. Henry Jones Co. v. Smith 
27 Utah 2d 225, 494 P.2d 526 (1972) 
Kingsbury v. Brown 
60 Idaho 464, 92 P.2d 1053 (1939) 
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson 
82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933) 
Manwill v. Oyler 
11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Bros. 
29 Utah 2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . 
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc. 
567 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . 
Starley v. Deseret Foods Cor~. 
93 Utah 577, 74 P.2d 122 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Valcarce v. Bitters 
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
COURT RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 ••• 
Third District Court Rules of Practice, Rule 10 . . . . . 
(iii) 
18 
19 
PAGE 
16 
16 
10 
6 
8 
16 
8 
11 
8 
5 
8 
10 
16 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TREATISES 
Corbin on Contracts, (1963) 
3 C.J.S., Agency (1973) •• 
17 C.J.S., Contracts (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, (1958) 
Restatement of Contracts (1932) 
(iv) 
10 
16 
10 
16 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMER'S INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
dba FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, 
DEVEAUX CLARK and CLARK YOUNG, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 18225 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter plaintiff) originally 
filed a two-count complaint, the first count asserting breach of 
contract, the second count asserting defamation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The order appealed from granted Defendants/Respondents' 
(hereinafter defendants) motion for summary judgment as to the first 
count, denied defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the 
second count, and denied plaintiff's motion to amend. (R. 69-70) 
That order was entered after oral argument of the motions on 
December 7, 1981. 
Trial having been set for January 13, 1982, a pre-trial 
settlement conference was held on January 6, 1982. At this 
conference plaintiff announced he would dismiss his second cause of 
action. The result was a further order disposing of the entire 
lawsuit. (R. 39) 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's statement of facts is deemed by defendants to 
be inadequate for comprehension of the legal issues involved. There 
follows a complete recitation of the material uncontested facts 
supported by the record. 
The facts set forth herein are primarily based upon the 
deposition testimony (and exhibits proffered during deposition) of 
the plaintiff himself. 
In May, 1978, plaintiff agreed to become a selling agent 
for Farmers..!/ (Supp. R., Vol. II, Ex. D-6; see also Supp. R., Vol. 
I, Ex. D-2).l/ That Agent Appointment Agreement executed by 
plaintiff called for the Companies to pay commissions upon business 
written by plaintiff and for plaintiff to sell insurance for the 
Companies. One of the important duties undertaken by Mr. Westley 
was "servicing all policyholders of the Companies in such a manner 
as to advance the interests of the policyholders, the Agent and the 
Companies." (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-2, para. B-2). 
!/ "Farmers" as used herein collectively refers to 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, Truck Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance 
Exchange, Mid-Century Insurance Company and Farmers New World Life 
Insurance Company. Defendants in this brief will also refer to this 
collective as "the Companies." Plaintiff has only sued Farmers 
Insurance Exchange even though his contract is with all five 
entities. 
'l:/ All exhibit references are to documents made exhibits 
during the depositions of plaintiff. 
-2-
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It has been Farmers' practice to assign to new agents 
existing policies of insurance that were written by persons no 
longer agents of Farmers, and for which Farmers paid the former 
agents contract value (See Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-2). These 
policies of insurance are called 500 series policies. The practice 
is described in the Agents Guide (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1). Less 
than full renewal commissions are paid the agent on 500 series 
policies. A purpose of Farmers assigning 500 series policies to new 
agents is to assist them in getting started (Supp. R., Vol. I, 
pp. 31-32). The stated policy of Farmers, as set out in Mr. 
Westley's Agents Guide (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1), and of which he 
was aware (Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 36), is that: 
Assignment of 500 series policies to a particular 
agent is not a permanent assignment to that agent. It may be 
again reassigned to a different agent anytime conditions 
indicate reassignment is in the best interest of the 
policyholders and the companies. 
Reassignments or transfers of policies are primarily 
made to provide the finest service possible to the 
policyholders.1/ At the same time, we need to make the best 
use of policies in developing a full time Agency Force. 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1, emphasis supplied) 
Pursuant to this written policy of Farmers, a qroup of 500 
series policies were assigned to plaintiff. (Supp. R., Vol. I, 
p. 36) After Mr. Westley had been an agent for a little more than a 
ll Policyholders are in need of the services of their 
agent for claims, "problems with a premium," revision of terms of 
coverage, as well as other matters (Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 25). 
-3-
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year, Farmers, upon the recommendation of the district manager, Mr. 
Clark (R. 49-50), took away from plaintiff the 500 series policies 
that had been assigned to him. (Supp. R., Vol I, p. 31) The 
consequence of this action is that Mr. Westley lost about $200 a 
month in renewal commissions from those 500 series policies 
(Supp. R., Vol. III, Ex. D-18; R. 45). It is this conduct which 
plaintiff, in Count I, characterized as a breach of contract by 
Farmers and Mr. Clark. (R. 5) Despite that characterization Mr. 
Westley, in sworn testimony, acknowledged Farmers right to withdraw 
the policies. "However, I also knew that if the company wanted I 
suppose they could take them back for just about any reason." 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 35) 
Plaintiff was engaged in other employment while an agent 
for Farmers. In the spring of 1979 plaintiff entered partnership 
with a Joseph Boberg as a private investigator (Supp. R., Vol. III, 
p. 9). By his own admission only about 75% of plaintiff's time was 
devoted to Farmers (Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 23), the balance of his 
time was as an investigator (Supp. R., Vol. II, p. 33; Supp. R., 
Vol. I, p. 25). The plaintiff's 1979 tax return more than bears out 
his testimony. It shows $9,711 gross income earned from his 
insurance business and $1,956 net income from his detective work 
(Supp. R., Vol. III, Ex. D-16). Mr. Westley admits he was informed 
that Farmers disapproved of part time status (Supp. R., Vol. II, 
p. 30) • 
-4-
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In September, 1979, Mr. Westley moved to an address on 
Fourth South in downtown Salt Lake City. His off ice was located on 
the third floor, a location Farmers' district manager objected to 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 20). His telephone was answered "law office" 
(since he was sharing a suite with some lawyers) and it was only 
months later that that situation was changed. The change was to the 
telephone being answered "Boberg Westley" (Supp. R., Vol. I, 
pp. 29-30). Mr. Westley was requested to remedy these deficiencies 
(R. 49-50). 
His failure to do so and his part time status caused 
Farmers to withdraw the 500 policies and reassign them (R. 49-50). 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT IMPERMISSIBLY BASED HIS ARGUMENT ON MATERIAL 
WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE RECORD. 
In his brief, plaintiff states that "[n]o record of the 
hearing exists, in that the Court below did not have a shorthand 
reporter present during argument: but during argument, the following 
issues of fact, which could not be summarily disposed of, were cited 
to the Law and Motion Judge." {Appellant's Brief at 4.) Plaintiff 
rests his entire argument for reversal of the summary judgment upon 
these "issues of fact." 
In Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 
(Utah, 1977), Appellant based his entire appeal on an assignment of 
error which he admitted was not suggested by the record. The Court 
ruled that in the absence of a record, the "court has nothing before 
it to review in respect to such assignment of error." Id. at 175-76. 
-5-
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This is precisely the situation which now confronts the 
Court. Plaintiff has appealed an issue which he acknowledges does 
not appear on the record. All plaintiff had to do in order to 
create an issue of fact for the record was to present one 
counter-affidavit. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah, 1975). Plaintiff failed even to do this. If plaintiff is 
permitted to appeal this question, the requirement that there be a 
record on appeal will be meaningless in Utah. Consequently, the 
trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE UNCONTESTED 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT 
As noted above the evidentiary record upon which the matter 
was decided below consisted almost entirely of the deposition 
testimony of plaintiff himself. It is plaintiff's own testimony 
that required summary judgment and requires aff irmance in this 
Court. 
A. There Is No Contract Respecting The 500 Series Policies. 
The relationship between Farmers and Westley was 
established and defined by the Agent Appointment Agreement. 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. 2) An examination of the Agent Appointment 
Agreement reveals that it is intended to be a fully integrated 
contract. The introductory language refers to "the following 
mutualiy agreed upon terms and conditions" which is language 
consistent with integration. 
-6-
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The terms and conditions are themselves clear and 
inclusive. In Clause A the Companies' obligations are set forth. 
They are: {l) to pay new business and service commissions in 
accordance with schedules as may be established by the Companies; 
(2) to provide for and pay a portion of group insurance benefits; 
(3) to provide manuals and forms; (4) to provide advertising 
assistance; and (5) to make available education and sales training 
programs. 
Mr. Westley, in turn, agreed in Clause B: (1) to sell 
insurance for the Companies on an exclusive basis; (2) to provide 
facilities for and to furnish service to all Farmer's policyholders; 
(3) to permit audits; and (4) to provide a fidelity bond. 
Additional clauses spell out in detail the rights of termination 
(Clause C), the agent's right to a review board hearing if he is 
terminated (Clause D), the right to renewal commissions on life 
insurance in the event of termination (Clause E), the right of the 
agent to assign his interest to a family member (Clause F), the 
right to receive compensation, called contract value, in the event 
of termination (Clause G), the agent's obligations upon termination 
(Clause H), the nature of the relationship (Clause I), and the 
provision that this "Agreement shall take the place of any previous 
••• Agreement" and that "No change, alteration, or modification of 
this Agreement may be made unless it is in writing and signed by the 
Agent and ••• the Companies" (Clause J). 
-7-
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This integrated contract contained no promise that Farmers 
would assign to Mr. Westley any 500 series policies. In urging that 
such a promise was made Appellant must go outside the integrated 
contract, to parol evidence. 
(1) The Agent Appointment Agreement is an Integrated 
Contract and as Such Cannot be Varied by Extrinsic 
Evidence. 
Its scope, its detail, its inclusiveness, all lead to the 
conclusion that the Agreement was intended to be an integrated 
contract. Restatement of Contracts, § 228 .(1932). National Surety 
Corp. v. Christiansen Bros., 29 Utah 2d 460, 511 P.2d 731, 733 
(1973). 
It is a long-standing and well recognized rule that 
integrated contracts cannot be varied by extrinsic evidence. 
Restatement of Contracts, § 237 (1932). This rule is well 
established in Utah: 
The rules of evidence are familiar and not disputed by the 
respondent that extrinsic evidence is not admissible either to 
contradict or subtract from, add to or vary, the terms of a 
written instrument, and that, in the absence of accident, fraud, 
or mistake of fact, the execution of a contract in writing is 
deemed to supersede all of the stipulations concerning its terms 
or subject-matter which preceded or accompanied its execution. 
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952, 956 
(1933}. See also, Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74 
P.2d 1221 (1938}; J. Henry Jones Co. v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 225, 494 
p. 2d 5 2 6 ( 19 7 2) • 
-8-
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Looking only at the integrated contract, there is nothing 
that requires Farmers to assign 500 series policies to Mr. Westley 
and nothing that prohibits Farmers, having once assigned them, from 
withdrawing them at its own will and discretion. 
(2) The Agent Appointment Agreement Has Not Been 
Modified to Provide for 500 Series Policy Assignments. 
Clause J of the Agent Appointment Agreement provides the 
exclusive method of amendment; that is a writing signed by the Agent 
and the Companies. (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-2) Mr. Westley can 
point to no document signed by both him and Farmers that provides 
for the assignment of 500 series policies. The best he can produce 
is a unilateral declaration by Farmers (the Agents Guide, Supp. R., 
Vol. I, Ex. D-1) of its continued intent to use 500 series policies 
as an agency building tool. That declaration by Farmers is not a 
modification of the contract with Mr. Westley because it fails to 
meet the prerequisites imposed by Clause J. 
(3) Farmers' Agents Guide Is Not a Separate Contract. 
As already mentioned, the integrated Agent Appointment 
Agreement required modifications of its terms to be in writing 
signed by both the Agent and Farmers. Because the Agents Guide 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1} is not signed by either party it clearly 
is not an amendment to the Agent Appointment Agreement. Nor is it a 
separate agreement. To be given the dignity of a separate agreement 
all the substantive rules relating to the formation of a contract 
would have to be met. 
-9-
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First, there was no offer in the sense that Farmers ever 
gave Mr. Westley the opportunity to either accept or reject the 
policy stated in the Agents Guide. Corbin on Contracts. (1963) 
§ 11, at 25. Rather, Farmers unilaterally announced through its 
Agents Guide that it would conduct its business in the way 
described. There is no suggestion that Farmers, by publishing its 
Agents Guide, intended to give Westley or any other agent the power 
to create a contract. 
Second, in order for there to be a contract the terms must 
be definite enough to put the parties on notice of their respective 
obligations. Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 
(1961); Efco Distr. Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966}. See also, 17 C.J.S. Contracts (1963) § 36(2). The Agents 
Guide lacks such definiteness in material respects. From the Agents 
Guide no number of policies to be assigned can be discerned or 
reasonably implied. Neither can it be discerned or implied for how 
long a term the assignment will last. The vagueness of these 
important points makes the Agents Guide not a contract, but a 
statement of Farmers' discretion. 
Finally, no consideration has been shown. Nothing is asked 
of the agent in exchange for the assignment of the 500 series 
policies. The Agents Guide only expresses an expectation that the 
Agent will serve the policyholders of the 500 series policies 
transferred to him. This represents no fresh consideration since 
the Agent Appointment Agreement (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-2) already 
-10-
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imposed upon the agent, in Clause B, the duty of "servicing all 
policyholders of the Companies in such a manner as to advance the 
interests of the policyholders, the Agent and the Companies." 
Because there was no consideration there can be no contract. 
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (1961). 
There being no contract respecting the 500 series policies; 
therefore there can be no breach. Hence, the trial court was 
correct in dismissing Count I. 
B. Even If The Policy Is Deemed A Contract There Has Been 
No Breach. 
As set forth above, defendants urge that the practice of 
Farmers respecting the 500 series policies is not a contract between 
Farmers and Mr. Westley. However, if the Court rules that the 
practice is a contract there has been no breach of that contract. 
(1) Farmers Did Not Promise to Let Agents Retain 
500 Series Policies. 
If there is any contract between Farmers and Mr. Westley it 
is stated in the writing respecting these 500 series policies. That 
writing is the Agents Guide (Supp. R., Vol. I Ex. D-1). In this 
document, it is stated that assignments of 500 series policies are 
intended primarily to provide service to policyholders. It is also 
stated that the agent to whom such policies are assigned will be 
paid a partial commission on renewals of such policies. 
-11-
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At most, assuming for now that there is a contract 
concerning the 500 series policies, the contract is simply Farmers' 
promise to pay partial commissions so long as the policies are 
assigned to the agent, and the agent's promise to service the 
policyholders so long as the policies are assigned to him. There is 
neither an express or implied promise to allow the agent to retain 
any such policies for any period of time. (Except in the situation 
where the agent writes a certain amount of additional insurance for 
a particular policyholder, resulting in a transfer of that business 
to the agent's own number. No issue is raised concerning this 
except ion.) 
Not only is there no promise, but the Agents Guide 
expressly negates any promise. The Agents Guide expressly says 
"[t]he assignment . is not a permanent assignment."· Since there 
was no promise vesting the 500 series policies in Mr. Westley the 
withdrawal of those policies cannot be a breach. Hence, the trial 
court properly dismissed Count I. 
(2) Farmers' Withdrawal of the 500 Series Policies 
Was in its Own and the Policyholders' Best Interests 
and, Hence, Justified. 
Not even plaintiff urges that Farmers had no right to 
withdraw the 500 series policies. "However, I also knew that if the 
company wanted I suppose they could take them back for just about 
any reason." (Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 35) Given that concession, 
plaintiff must concede that if Farmers had any rational reason for 
withdrawing the policies no breach has been shown. 
-12-
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The purpose of temporarily assigning 500 series policies to 
agents is to serve the "best interest of the policyholders and the 
Companies." (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1) 
It is clearly in the best interest of policyholders that 
the agent assigned to them be available on a full-time basis. 
Policyholders are in need of the services of their agent for claims, 
"problems with a premium," revision of terms of coverage, as well as 
other matters (Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 25). Obviously the more time 
an agent devotes to the business the better served are the 
policyholders. Thus, it is in the interests of the policyholders 
that agents be full-time agents, freely available during all 
reasonable business hours. If Farmers' policyholders are well 
served by their agent, they are more likely to renew their insurance 
with Farmers. It is precisely for this reason that it is in 
Farmers' best interest that agents be full-time. Full-time agents 
also will sell more insurance than part-time agents, and for this 
reason also it is in Farmer's interest that its agents be full-time. 
The Agents Guide (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. -D-1) expressly 
recognized this interest: 
Reassignments or transfers of policies are primarily made to 
provide the finest service possible to the policyholder. At the 
same time, we need to make the best use of policies in 
developing a full time producin9 Agency Force. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The evidence is uncontradicted that plaintiff was engaged 
in other employment while an agent for Farmers. In the spring of 
1979 plaintiff entered partnership with one Joseph Boberg as a 
-13-
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private investigator (Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 9). By his own 
adrnision only about 75% of plaintiff's time was devoted to Farmers 
(Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 23), the balance of his time was as an 
investigator (Supp. R., Vol. II, p. 331 Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 25). 
The plaintiff's 1979 tax return more than bears out his testimony. 
It shows $9,711 gross income earned from his insurance business and 
$1·,956 net income from his detective work (Supp. R., Vol. III, 
Ex. 0-16) • 
Mr. Westley admits he was informed that Farmers disapproved 
of part time status (Supp. R., Vol. II, p. 30). The 500 series 
policies were withdrawn, in part, because the District Manager 
believed Mr. Westley was not devoting full time to Farmers' business 
(R. 49-50). The District Manager's conduct was justified because 
Farmers had a legitimate interest in encouraging full-time agents, 
and, conversely, discouraging part-time agents. For this reason 
alone there can be no breach of contract. 
In September, 1979, Mr. Westley moved to an address on 
Fourth South in downtown Salt Lake City. His office was located on 
the third floor, a location the district manager objected to 
(Supp. R., Vol. I, p. 20). His telephone was answered "law office" 
(since he was sharing a suite with some lawyers) and it was only 
months later that that situation was changed. The change was to the 
telephone being answered "Boberg Westley" (Supp. R., Vol. I, 
pp. 29-30). 
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It is quite apparent that it is in Farmers' interest that its 
agents be visible and easily accessible. Taking a walk-up off ice in 
a downtown business section with a telephone answering service that 
doesn't identify the agent as a Farmers agent is a disservice to 
Farmers. To fail to correct the situation, to remain obdurately 
invisible and inaccessible, warrants the conclusion that the best 
interests of Farmers and its policyholders would be served by 
reassigning the 500 series policies. Moreover, Mr. Westley's 
officing arrangement itself constituted a breach of the Agent 
Appointment Agreement. That agreement, paragraph B(2), required Mr. 
Westley "to provide facilities necessary to furnish insurance 
services to all policyholders of the Companies." An agent whose 
phone is answered "law office" is not in a position to furnish 
insurance services. 
The Agents Guide (Supp. R., Vol. I, Ex. D-1) is quite clear 
that the interests of Farmers and its policyholders are paramount. 
Farmers' action was taken to protect those interests. Such conduct 
is expressly justified and cannot be deemed a breach of contract. 
c. There Can Be No Cause Of Action Against The 
Defendant Clark For Breach Of Contract. 
There is no doubt that plaintiff's Agent Appointment 
Agreement was a contract between him and the Companies, the 
insurance entities collectively called Farmers. Mr. Clark is not a 
party to that contract. Nor is he a party to any contract that may 
have been created by Farmers' publication of its Agency Guide. Mr. 
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Clark is only an agent, a disclosed agent, for Farmers. As such, no 
contractual duty was owed by Clark to Westley. Restatement (Second) 
of Agency, § 320 (1958}. 3 C.J.S., Agency, § 361, at 173, § 365 at 
180 (1973). Hence, the trial court properly dismissed Count I as to 
Mr. Clark. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to 
amend was a valid exercise of discretion. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that after responsive pleadings have 
been filed, a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of the 
court and that leave shall be granted as justice requires. In 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 324, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960), this Court 
explained that "[t]he permitting of amendments to pleadings rests in 
the sound discretion of the trial court." When a matter is left to 
the discretion of the trial court, the function of a reviewing court 
is to prevent abuse of discretion not to substitute its judgment for 
the judgment of the trial court. Book v. Book, 59 Wyo. 423, 141 
P.2d 546, 550 (1943): Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P.2d 
1053, 1057 (1939). Where good reasons for the trial court's 
decision exist, there cannot be abuse of discretion. Here, there 
were several good reasons for the trial court's decision. 
First, permitting plaintiff's amendment would have caused 
undue delay. The delay would have been undue because it could 
easily have been prevented. Plaintiff's motion was presented on the 
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eve of trial as the time for discovery, as per Rule 10 of the Third 
District Rules of Practice, was coming to a close. Plaintiff's 
complaint was filed on April 23, 1980. The substance of the 
amendment was known no later than November 24, 1980 when plaintiff 
discussed it in his deposition. (Supp. R., Vol. III, p. 36.) The 
amendment was not proposed for a full year later in November 23, 
1981, by which time defendant had prepared his motion for summary 
judgment. Plaintiff had more than ample opportunity to amend his 
complaint during the preceding year. He had already asked for and 
received one six-month continuance (R. 47A). Instead, plaintiff 
waited until defendant's motion for summary judgment was to be heard 
and until trial was little more than one month away before moving 
for leave to amend and for a second continuance. Earlier action was 
feasible and would have prevented the delay. 
Second, the proposed amendment alleges malicious conduct. 
The record is void of evidence of malicious conduct on the part of 
defendants. Plaintiff's brief fails to point out any portion of 
the record which even suggests that the defendants had a malicious 
intent. Permitting this amendment would be a waste of valuable 
judicial time and would not further justice. 
In this case, considerations of undue delay and waste of 
time outweighed any small purpose which would be served by admitting 
the amendment. While other minds might have decided this question 
differently, the trial court's decision is grounded on the idea that 
there must be an end to litigation. Judicial resources are limited 
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and there was no substantial justification in continuing this trial 
to hear this amendment after plaintiff had so long failed to bring 
it before the court. There was no abuse of discretion and the trial 
court's decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly decided plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and did not abuse its discretion in not granting 
defendant leave to amend. Defendants urge this Court to affirm the 
trial court in all respects. 
DATED this i?,J' day ' 1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Warren Patten 
of Fabian & Clendenin, a 
Professional Corporation, 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
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correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent by u. S. Mail, 
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Lambertus Jansen, Esq. 
525 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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